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Justification for a Nuclear Global Health
Workforce: multidisciplinary analysis of risk,
survivability & preparedness, with emphasis
on the triage management of thermal
burns
Frederick M. Burkle Jr1,2,7*, Tom Potokar3, James E. Gosney Jr4 and Cham Dallas5,6
Abstract
Major challenges and crises in global health will not be solved by health alone; requiring rather a multidisciplinary,
evidence-based analytical approach to prevention, preparedness and response. One such potential crisis is the
continued spread of nuclear weapons to more nations concurrent with the increased volatility of international
relations that has significantly escalated the risk of a major nuclear weapon exchange. This study argues for the
development of a multidisciplinary global health response agenda based on the reality of the current political
analysis of nuclear risk, research evidence suggesting higher-than-expected survivability risk, and the potential for
improved health outcomes based on medical advances. To date, the medical consequences of such an exchange
are not credibly addressed by any nation at this time, despite recent advances. While no one country could mount
such a response, an international body of responders organized in the same fashion as the current World Health
Organization’s global health workforce initiative for large-scale natural and public health emergencies could
enlist and train for just such an emergency. A Nuclear Global Health Workforce is described for addressing the
unprecedented medical and public health needs to be expected in the event of a nuclear conflict or catastrophic
accident. The example of addressing mass casualty nuclear thermal burns outlines the potential triage and clinical
response management of survivors enabled by this global approach.
Keywords: Global Health workforce, Nuclear war, Triage, Nuclear thermal burns, World Health Organization,
Emergency medical teams
Background
The humanitarian health professions learned many hard
lessons from the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. Despite
previous warnings from the 2003 SARS pandemic and
the passage of the International Health Regulations
Treaty in 2005 and updated in 2009 [1], poor Treaty
compliance, lack of financial support, and leadership
failures ultimately led to delays in recognition and
response to the Ebola epidemic [2]. Post-Ebola appeals
for a World Health Organization (WHO) led global
health workforce resulted in 2014 of the development of
country-supported international and national emergency
medical teams (EMTs) for rapid and sustained response
to sudden onset natural disasters (SoDs), public health
emergencies of international concern (PHEICs) and
conflict-related complex humanitarian emergencies
(CHEs) [2]. In 2015, amid the increasing risk of a
nuclear crisis with unmitigated and shared components
of both CHEs and PHEICs, Burkle and Dallas argued
for the inclusion within the WHO agenda of a nu-
clear global health workforce capacity and operational
framework [3].
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This study, based on current multidisciplinary analysis of
geopolitical risk, scientific nuclear survivability research,
and medical advances in both triage management and the
acute and chronic care of nuclear thermal burns, as one
clinical example, argues that life-saving opportunities are
possible if rapidly deployed, justifying the development of a
multidisciplinary nuclear global health workforce.
Analysis of risk of nuclear war
As writers and watchdogs on nuclear risks and the
health outcomes of nuclear war, we are worried. From a
scientist’s standpoint, general ignorance of the medical
and public health realities of nuclear tragedies has never
been at such a dangerously high level. Since the 1980s
and the Chernobyl disaster, at least 7 individual nuclear
accidents including the Fukushima Daichi tragedy and
Russian K-84 submarine accident have occurred. The
breakup of the former Soviet Union led to less security
over fissile materials and the “undetected smuggling of
weapons-usable nuclear material or how much was
diverted or stolen since” that may support global terror-
ism groups with the stated aim to utilize this technology
[4]. The current “conventional wisdom is that a dirty
bomb is far more likely than a conventional bomb” [5].
Rather than moving toward a “nuclear free world” the
U.S. finds itself embarking on a $1 trillion nuclear weapons
“modernization program” to counter increasing Russian
provocations [6]. Every other nuclear power worldwide
has either increased the size of their arsenal or modernized
it [3]. While there has been an overall decline in the num-
ber of nuclear weapons worldwide, the steady expansion of
nuclear stockpiles to more national states (including highly
aggressive and arguably unstable ones), the continuous
modernization of arsenals and a concurrent decline in re-
gional stability, especially in the South Asian subcontinent,
provides an increasingly dangerous flashpoint for nuclear
war. The total number of nuclear weapons reached a peak
in the 1980s, more countries now possess them. Risks of a
nuclear tragedy are significantly building despite vigorous
attempts at slowing proliferation.
India and Pakistan fought four wars over the four
decades preceding their acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The religious animosity is deep-seated, having lasted for
over a thousand years. Today, while both nations have
over a hundred nuclear weapons, all of them in the
Hiroshima size range (15-20 kT yield), they are in the
process of rapidly proliferating nuclear stockpiles.
Pakistan is adding 20 weapons per year, the fastest
numerical level of proliferation worldwide while India is
poised to achieving thermonuclear weapons (>100 kT
yield). Others regard Pakistan’s 2015 plan to deploy tactical
short-range, low yield nuclear weapons (Less than 5 kT) as
“problematic and risky” arguing that such weapons “lower
the threshold for nuclear weapon use” [7]. This argument
began in the new Century with the suggestion that these
“low yield” weapons could be used in conventional
conflicts, blurring the distinction between nuclear and
conventional war [8]. Critics claim that “what smaller does
is to make the weapon more thinkable” [9].
In addition to the intense rivalry with Pakistan, India
also perceives a growing threat from dramatic increases
in the military stature of China. This is further exacer-
bated by the highly publicized nuclear activities by Iran,
which after IAEA-documented research efforts in nu-
clear weapon development, today Iran has the capability
to develop a nuclear weapon [10]. Therefore, there exists
a rapid and accelerating nuclear proliferation in the
South Asian subcontinent where neither India nor
Pakistan has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty. Analysts worldwide are concerned for the
stability of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal fuelled by grow-
ing tensions between its military and civilian leadership,
tribal and radical Islamic warfare and the acknowledged
presence of the followers of these groups in the Pakistan
government [11]. The increasingly violent warfare
between Sunni and Shiite Islamic forces in the Middle
East and South Asia has led to anxiety over acquisition
of nuclear weapons by wealthy and influential Sunni
Saudi Arabia from Sunni Pakistan to counter the pursuit
of nuclear weapons capability by Shiite Iran.
Beside the Cold War Northern hemisphere build up the
steady increase in number and weapon size of South Asian
nuclear arsenals in this crowded corner of the planet is
otherwise unprecedented. Globally, “modernization” still
refers to nuclear proliferation and it is now world-
wide. An unnamed official from the Obama adminis-
tration explained, “Why is it that we’re trying to
prevent the Pakistani government from collapsing?
Because we fundamentally believe that we cannot
afford a country with 80-100 nuclear weapons becom-
ing the Congo…there is a sense that other places in
the world can go to hell, but not this one” [12].
Emerging conditions that mimic Cold War mindsets
should make us increasingly wary. Russia’s military exer-
cises and explicit threats against other countries and es-
pecially their vigorous nuclear modernization program
reflects their conviction that strategic nuclear forces are
indispensible for security and status as a great power [9].
Today, nuclear weapons and what they symbolically
represent varies significantly from the regional power
rivalries of the past. Most worrisome are that the posses-
sion of advanced nuclear weaponry, once steadfastly
controlled by arguably rational regimes, has taken on
more religious significance in countries where they are
worshipped both as a national strength and as a right, or
as a “currency of power to which many countries still
aspire.” How such religious fervor might influence and
justify their use has not been adequately researched, but
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should not limit the topic from being integrated into
existing deliberations if that risk is to be mitigated [13].
It is also discouraging that American attitudes regard-
ing nuclear weapons use, the so-called “nuclear taboo”,
have changed since post-WWII when public opinion
supported an aversion to the use of nuclear weapons.
Current “instincts of the U.S. public, when facing our
worst foes” have shifted with a “sizeable segment of the
American public” feeling “an attraction to our most de-
structive weapons, not an aversion”. Previous “commit-
ment to the immunity of civilians from deliberate attack
in wartime, even with vast casualties, is shallow” [14].
Survivability in nuclear war
Nuclear negotiators rarely mention the dire health
outcomes, nor have the tragic health consequences ever
been used as an agenda item or an incentive for nuclear
non-proliferation negotiations. These actions suggest
that denial, as a protective mechanism of most humans,
is massive cross-culturally, even among seasoned health
care providers when it comes to contemplating the
possibility of a nuclear tragedy [15].
Recent scientific research assists in dispelling the
thinking that started in the 1950s that nuclear conflicts
would result in very few survivors. Today’s research
supports that a nuclear war, even a catastrophic duel be-
tween Iran and Israel, would result in an extraordinary
number of surviving radiation, trauma and thermal burn
patients receiving almost no medical care or even pain
relief [15–18].
One of the most pervasive perceptions left over from
the Cold War is the consideration of the inevitability of
high mortality and injury rates from nuclear war, in high
proportion to the overall targeted population. This was
due to the potential for large numbers (perhaps even
thousands of weapons) of high yield nuclear devices
(hundreds and in many cases thousands of kilotons
each) being in a nuclear conflict between the super-
powers. Known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD),
it proved to be a powerful deterrent to the use of nuclear
weapons during the decades after the Second World
War. However, it also left a remarkably persistent
perception that the use of nuclear weapons inevitably
resulted in a high proportion of casualties to the popula-
tion of the area attacked, even to the extent that medical
and public health personnel, military planners, political
thought leaders and policy makers, and other decision
makers continue to operate under this assumption.
Today the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has as its most likely scenario for a nuclear
weapon detonation in the U.S. as a 10 kT nuclear
weapon in an urban area [18]. It is also widely assumed
that a single nuclear weapon detonation is the most
likely nuclear event to be seen, with several of these
relatively smaller weapons being used in a short period
of time as the next most likely event. Put in a strictly
quantitative framework, this means that it is incumbent
on health and civil services to have sufficient emergency
preparedness for a situation in which cumulative kiloton
nuclear attack of from 10 to 50 kT occurs. This is
strikingly different from the MAD structure of a total
5000,000 kT attack (1000 kT times 5000 weapons, still
only a fraction of the total arsenal of our opponents in
the Cold War). In this illustrative example, this is a
100,000-fold difference, or 5 orders of magnitude.
Clearly, even with some considerable contraction of the
breadth of difference, the remarkably disproportional
impact of the health care impact in the Cold War and
the current time must be acknowledged.
Illustrative example of nuclear war survivability
Looking closely at the detailed health outcome of a 20
kT detonation in Washington, D.C., better brings into
focus the reality of the current threat, as was done in a
U.S. Senate Homeland Security Hearing given by co-
author (CD) and at which the current Secretary of
Defense was also a speaker [19]. In short, the high
lethality and morbidity in the first mile or two around
the blast area gives way to a narrow slice of area where
actual radiation-induced casualties occur in a plume out-
side this inner zone, which actually covers only a small
part of the city. In the first 750 m (12 psi) virtually all
buildings will be destroyed by blast, mass fires are com-
mon and prompt radiation doses are fatal except in
basements, resulting in very few survivors. Between 750
and 1250 m the peak overpressure decreases from 12 to
5 psi with walls blown out of buildings. Debris will be
tens of feet thick in most downtown areas with ten story
plus buildings. Roughly half of the population in this
relatively limited area will be fatalities, mainly from
collapsing buildings, with the other half injured. Most of
those surviving will have been exposed to a fatal dose of
prompt radiation, though death will occur first due to
mass fires or third degree burns. Between 1250 m and
1750 m peak overpressures will fall from 5 psi to near
3 psi, and burn thresholds towards the edge of this zone
will drop from third degree to second degree levels. At
1900 m or 3 psi, large numbers of trauma injury would
ensue from walls blown out of steel framed buildings,
severe residential damage and people caught in the
open. By 2000 m burn risk will drop to first degree
levels. At up to 3800 m or 1 psi people will be endan-
gered with flying glass and debris from damaged struc-
tures and glass will break out to over 6 kms. The very
high deposition rates of radioactive particles that occur
in the first km from the detonation rapidly drops off in
magnitude, along with the resulting radiation-induced
casualties, with wind dispersion.
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This description, however, accounts for only about 1
mile across of an urban area, with the rest of the sprawl-
ing urban landscape of U.S. cities as unaffected, with the
exception of a relatively narrow plume of casualties in-
duced by sufficient radioactive fallout that can continue
to extend out for several miles. However, most people
think of these effects extending for 10, 20 or more miles
across an urban landscape in all directions. Using a
clock-face analogy, the much-feared health effects from
the radioactive plume for a 10- or 20-kT detonation with
wind coming from the West would roughly approximate
only a 2:00 to 4:00 region for several miles, with the rest
of the clock-face outside the 1–2 mile radius around
Ground Zero as completely unaffected in terms of
direct health care consequences due immediately to
the nuclear weapon detonation [20]. There would be
extensive indirect and potentially preventable effects
due to power grid loss, lack of access to food, water,
sanitation, shelter, access to and availability of health-
care and medicines, increased crime, and the health
issues related to internally displaced people, especially
vulnerable populations [21].
The healthcare affected population in the Washington
20 kT scenario will entail a daunting task for response,
but would actually involve only a fraction of the total
population [22]. Nuclear war casualties can in this con-
text be simplified to thermal burn, trauma, radiation cas-
ualties and combined injuries. Defining the mortality
and surviving populations is inexact, but due to the large
difference between the reasonably assumed mortality
and the known unaffected areas, the error in these
assumptions is not great. All thermal casualties would
number about 40,000, with 25,000 of these as the more
survivable first degree burns. The combined fallout and
blast affected populations (dead and surviving injured)
would number about 220,000. However, 50,000 of these
are in the fallout zones where mortality is less than 10%.
Another 60,000 of the blast casualties are in the 1-2 psi
zone and most would be expected to survive. Therefore,
in this rough approximation there are 260,000 combined
thermal burn, trauma, and radiation affected population.
Assuming 70% survival in the first degree burn
(0.7 × 25,000 = 17,500) [17] and 1-2 psi zone trauma
patients (0.7 × 60,000 = 42,000) and 90% survival in low
fallout zones (0.9 × 50,000 = 45,000), means that
subtracting these survivors from the total affected
population leaves approximately 100,000 deaths. The
70% figure is an estimate of the survival rate for the
combined injury of trauma from 1 to 2 psi earthquake
survival rate together with the first degree burns. Most
of the deaths would be due to the trauma, not the first
degree burns, which are expected here to exacerbate the
trauma injury severity [17]. It also leaves over 160,000
surviving injured likely requiring acute and chronic
assistance. When one considers that the total metropol-
itan population of Washington, D.C., is over 6 million,
this means that about 4% of the population of metropol-
itan Washington is likely to be affected by the most
likely nuclear device to be used (10-20 kT), with 1.5%
mortality and 2.5% injuries requiring assistance.
While a 1.5% mortality in a population is a devastating
experience for any society, it is dramatically different
from the common expectations one sees from the
general population, or even educated medical circles,
where MAD conditioning has left the impression of
much higher mortality. It is incumbent on responsible
medical and public health planners to acknowledge this
discrepancy and put into practice (and support finan-
cially and with qualified personnel) the appropriate re-
sponse to deal with what is a much more manageable,
though still daunting, mass casualty medical response
than previously acknowledged.
Preparedness for nuclear global health workforce
The ICRC reminds us that for more than four decades
during the Cold War preparedness drills were regularly
conducted, shelters maintained and anti-nuclear protests
took place. Two generations later, with most born after
the end of the Cold War, the level of awareness of the
risks to humanity are much less, especially in the U.S.
but also worldwide [23]. Any one of a number of in-
creasingly feasible regional conflicts with the growing list
of nuclear powers, including increasingly aggressive ones
more likely to use the weapons than in the past (India/
Pakistan, Sunni/Shiite, Iran/Israel, Russia/NATO, North
Korea) would expose an almost complete lack of pre-
paredness of any of these nations to help the people who
survive it. Nuclear tragedies result in the loss of basic
command-and-control, mass surgical and trauma casual-
ties suffering blast injuries, 1st, 2nd and 3rd degree thermal
burns, radiation contamination, and multiple lacerations,
orthopedic and crush injuries, severe combined effect
injuries, and major psychosocial outcomes [3].
In addition to the fact that surviving physicians, nurses
and emergency responders would be overwhelmed, most
would lack the skills and the tools to treat the unprece-
dented number of thermal burn and radiation victims.
Survivors in primarily “Injury Zones” would in a short
time become “Death Zones” making the differences
medically between the two zones almost meaningless
[3]. This is obviously unacceptable to any observer, and
demands a response from rational planners.
A nuclear event will result in an unprecedented mass
casualty incident that produces large scale direct mortal-
ity and morbidity requiring the rapid deployment of
mobile, self-contained, self-sufficient health care facilities
and subsequently the more indirect health outcomes
resulting from a destroyed essential public health
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infrastructure and the daily protections they afford soci-
ety [24]. Hauer discusses the increasing likelihood of nu-
clear terrorism and how ill prepared the U.S. and other
nations are to respond, asserting that “in most multi-
casualty incidents, there are one or two triage points
where victims are taken for assessment and routing to
treatment. Following a nuclear detonation in a major city
with a vast geographical footprint there could be need of
25 to 75 such triage points or more” [25]. Deployed emer-
gency health facilities must have the capacity and capabil-
ity to bring life-saving care as close to the frontline of the
tragedy as is safely possible. In a series of 10 focus group
discussions with ED physicians and nurses conducted in
the USA in 2008, study participants consistently stated
that neither ED ‘s nor hospital facilities were sufficiently
prepared for a terrorist attack involving radioactive mate-
rials and expressed a need not only for more information
but also strongly disagreed with some of the existing re-
sponse guidelines [26]. Recommended requirements for
centrally coordinated mobile and fixed initial triage and
dose-monitoring facilities designed to identify, assess,
transfer, decontaminate, and move casualties efficiently to
survivor or palliative care facilities include: (1) Nuclear
Triage Centers, (2) Nuclear Survival Centers, (3) Nuclear
Palliative Care Centers, and (4) Health System Support
Centers [3]. Recognizing the vast numbers of casualties
that will occur, operationally all emergency medical
teams would become resource scarce or constrained
in a short period of time requiring unprecedented lo-
gistical resupply system that does not exist today.
Existing International Atomic Energy Agency and
WHO assets (field-level guidelines, nuclear triage and
management plans, worksheets and technical monitor-
ing standards for radiation overexposure) are avail-
able, however altered standards of care will be
practiced at every level on a daily basis.
Triage management of thermal burns enabled by
a nuclear global health workforce
As an example of the potential impact of a Nuclear Global
Health Workforce on constructing an effective medical
response, the very difficult subset of nuclear war mass
casualty thermal burn response is addressed. Over the de-
cades since atomic bombs struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki
one of the most common photographic reminders of these
horrific events have been those of chronic keloid disfigure-
ments resulting from thermal burns; reminders of both
the suffering and survivability of nuclear war. Surviving
medical professionals would be expected to be limited to
treating lacerations and fractures, leaving those with
severe thermal burns to die slowly of infection. It should
be recognized that radiation burns also occur after a nu-
clear detonation, where a skin burn occurs due to ionizing
radiation and not thermal energy, and that the over-
whelming majority of these “burn” victims do not survive.
In contrast, the thermal burn victims include a large num-
ber of surviving patients that can greatly benefit from ap-
propriate medical intervention. Actually this is a fairly
common mistake made in nuclear detonation discussions,
where radiation and thermal burn statements are made
interchangeably. From a triage point of view it is greatly
simplified by the fact that the very large radiation dose
required to generate a radiation burn insures that the
patient will not likely survive, while fairly low exposures to
heat energy will create a surviving thermal burn patient.
To avoid the confusion which sometimes occurs in “burn”
discussions related to a nuclear detonation, in all future
burn discussion here, thermal burns are being referred to,
and not radiation burns. Jeng and colleagues emphasize
that triage decisions need to be made carefully, allowing
the focus of limited personnel and equipment on those
most likely to survive [27].
With current triage approaches, it is highly unlikely
that the very large number of thermal burn victims will
receive any meaningful medical treatment suggesting
that a lower-tech approach could save many lives and
involve training armies of non-specialists in surgical
debridement and the administration of burn medicines
[3]. Burn treatment as a high-tech endeavour would only
be pursued in well-equipped hospital units where
each patient gets constant attention from several
specialists [3].
Yet, society recognizes legal, ethical and moral expec-
tations and obligations that during crises triage plans
exist to treat as many victims as possible who have an
opportunity for survival. When triage is performed in
accordance with accepted medical practice, triage is both
sanctioned and recognized by law in most countries.
Because unrealistic triage results in unacceptable deaths
rates among those who should survive, triage plans must
be well thought out and designed. In fact, medical pro-
viders are held legally accountable for the triage process
where there is rule of law, but the process itself cannot
ensure either treatment or survival [28]. In 1986, Lean-
ing described in detail the unique challenges health care
providers face in the triage and treatment of casualties
from nuclear war. She stressed that “reference to prece-
dent may admit sources of serious error, since in terms
of scale of effects, this disaster would depart fundamen-
tally from anything the world has yet experienced”
further observing that whereas radiation injury must
receive substantial attention, a synergism exists between
burn and blast and the triage category of “expectant”
may extend over a wide range of injury, including many
who might in other, less-stressed circumstances be
assigned greater chances of survival” [29]. Kumar and
Jagetia contend that it will be very difficult to save
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victims with a TBSA of more than 30% and exposure of
more than 4Gy of ionising radiation. Most available
medical resources should be diverted to treating less
severe and moderate combined injuries [30].
Coleman and colleagues provide realistic and thoughtful
accounts of the current capacity, capability and future
requirements necessary to sort, assess, treat, triage, moni-
tor, recover and rehabilitate casualties and the public
health protections after a nuclear attack [31–33]. They
emphasize the criticality of triage in resource poor settings
involving extensive preplanning, stating in 2016 that “an
understanding of the requirements for biodosimetry,
triage and treatment decisions, and massive public health
and medical response informs and modifies the over-all
large-scale operational response” [31]. While it is unfortu-
nate that in most of the existing healthcare communities
these skill sets needed in nuclear war medical response
are simply lacking, it is entirely feasible that they could be
gained by the appropriate training protocols and especially
in the kind of international cooperative venues such as
mass casualty exercises which require extensive planning
and preliminary training. Therefore, in order to address
these demanding resource needs it would be of high utility
to mobilize the existing civilian and military healthcare
personnel in not only the immediate affected nation but
also in cooperating additional nations in a coordinated
manner. A critical feature toward this end would be to in-
corporate retired healthcare personnel and the mature
voluntary aid societies in well organized training para-
digms and especially mass casualty management exercises
with the existing healthcare sector. This would enable the
twin needs of greatly expanding the number of qualified
healthcare participants that are needed, and adding the
critical missing training skill sets such as dosimetry and
mass casualty triage and treatment to this expanded popu-
lation. As it is established that a single nuclear event will
exceed the capacity of any single nation to respond, this
also enables the bringing together of the necessary volume
as well as appropriate quality of healthcare resources in a
viable organized fashion. We suggest that to effectively
operationalize such an endeavor requires the necessity of
a nuclear global health workforce organized, trained and
supervised by the larger global network of governmental
and non-governmental resources.
Advances in thermal burn management to
incorporate into a nuclear global health
workforce
The management of burns has improved dramatically
over the last 50 years, to the extent that in a fully
resourced modern burns centre in a high income coun-
try burns of up to 80% TBSA can regularly survive. The
developments that have led to these improvements have
been stepwise and summative, but include early fluid
resuscitation, early excision and grafting, management of
sepsis, management of inhalation injury, nutritional
support, use of cadaveric allograft and artificial dermal
templates. In addition the creation of well trained
dedicated multidisciplinary burn teams and advances in
rehabilitation, scar management and psychosocial
support has meant that not only has survival improved,
but also quality of life post burn injury.
However, it is highly unlikely given the current cir-
cumstances that these gold standard modern burn man-
agement practices would be available after a nuclear
disaster. In addition there are already enormous discrep-
ancies between what is available in a high income versus
resource poor country. Access to burn services and
outcomes from burn injury in most of the world is poor
with lack of trained staff, negligible pre hospital care,
transport difficulties and insufficient materials – in other
words not dissimilar to the situation after a nuclear
incident.
The response to a medically overwhelming number of
burn casualties after release of a nuclear device cannot
therefore be limited to existing burns services which if
not destroyed in the initial explosion would be totally
overwhelmed within minutes. Therefore there is need
for a complete paradigm shift in thinking and prepared-
ness preparation. As noted previously, the most likely
nuclear weapons to be used in the near future are the
relatively smaller (Hiroshima/Nagasaki-sized) devices,
which not only produce much fewer casualties than
thermonuclear devices, but also a much smaller propor-
tion of thermal burns as part of the total injuries of these
larger nuclear devices.
Triage is clearly critical and has to be realistic, based
on survivability and available resources (Table 1). The
most impactful approach is likely to be simple, early
management of the large number of relatively superficial
flash burns, up to 30% TBSA and associated with min-
imal or no contamination or other injuries (unless very
minor). Taking the example of a 20 Kt explosion in a city
such as Washington, DC, the predicted number of
people (of all ages) with superficial burns would be
25,000 – most likely dazed, confused, psychologically
disturbed and in an environment where almost all of the
infrastructure has been destroyed. Clearly these numbers
are way beyond what can be managed by a single emer-
gency medical team, but this cohort of patients are po-
tentially amenable to either ‘self treatment’ or ‘buddy
treatment’ and therefore one of the roles of the EMT
would be to rapidly distribute essential treatment pack-
ages along with very simple instructions. In this scenario
early oral resuscitation is likely to be more practical and
achievable than intravenous resuscitation, although if
there has been radiation exposure vomiting may be a
problem [27, 34]. Analgesia should be available and
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instructions given on cleaning wounds and applying an
antimicrobial ointment with closed dressings. There are
numerous modern silver impregnated dressings that are
more suitable for superficial partial thickness injuries that
once applied can be left for 5–7 days which may well be
more appropriate but are significantly more costly. Part of
preparedness development would be identifying the exact
contents of such ‘individual emergency burn packs’. The
other large group of potentially survivable burns would be
those with either larger surface area superficial burns or
deeper burns most likely up to a maximum of 40% TBSA.
In a low resource environment deep burns beyond this
rarely survive even in a moderately well equipped and
staffed burns services. The second role of a burn specific
EMT would then be to deal with these patients. It is feas-
ible within a field hospital setting to undertake excision
and grafting of these patients, and early excision would be
preferable as this not only improves outcomes and mortal-
ity in general, but also reduces infective complications
[35]. There have also been advances in human fibroblast-
derived temporary skin substitutes, with potential applica-
tions in mass casualty burn treatment as has been demon-
strated after fire-fighter thermal burn treatment [36, 37].
The use of these skin substitutes might have feasibility in
the treatment of the potentially large number of burn vic-
tims in a nuclear scenario, as their use may feasibly delay
the inflammatory response in treated patients long enough
to enable the mass casualty transport and triage delays
until more conventional and effective burn treatments can
occur. If there has been concomitant low level irradiation
then the impact on the immune system will be delayed by
4–6 days, so ideally patients should be excised and grafted
before this stage. With the potential of several thousand
patients requiring early excision and grafting, it is clear
that multiple EMT’s would be needed to perform this;
however, appropriate triage and rapid simple surgery
could potentially save a significant number of these pa-
tients. Combined thermal and irradiation injuries have a
worse prognosis, whilst pure radiation burns are not like
thermal burns in that the radiation kills the basal layer of
dividing cells and therefore desquamation is not seen for
several days and this type of injury usually result in super-
ficial burns only [38].
In the event of only a fraction of the thermally injured
surviving (say 10%) this would still equate to between
2500 and 4000 patients in the scenario described above.
These patients will then need ongoing care and rehabili-
tation. Burns that have healed within 2 weeks are un-
likely to need ongoing management beyond application
of simple moisturisers and advice on skin care and pro-
tection. However, deeper burns and those taking longer
than 2 weeks will need early rehabilitation, ideally start-
ing with appropriate positioning and/or splinting, mobil-
isation and nutritional support. Again, it is clear that in
the acute stages access to standard nursing and therapy
care will not be possible and therefore alternative
approaches will be required. EMT’s with appropriate
training could create ‘temporary burn care teams’ from
surviving casualties (and indeed patients with only
minor burns) and provide simple instructions and
demonstrations of key points with respect to nursing
care and acute rehabilitation (focussing on preventing
problems further down the line).
Current burn mass casualty plans that have been
developed do not consider the same level of magnitude
of casualties that would be the inevitable result of a nu-
clear attack. Post 9/11 ‘bypass’ strategies have been re-
placed with the concept of ‘absorption’ strategies and
developing surge capacity. However, these still focus on
‘traditional’ concepts such as moving patients with ser-
ious burn injuries to a burns centre and keeping those
less severe in outlying hospitals until beds become avail-
able in a burns center [39].
In the USA there are only 128 burn centers (with a
total burn-bed capacity of 1835) and only 43 burn
centers are verified by the American Burn Association
and the American College of Surgeons through a rigor-
ous review program designed to determine if the burn
center’s resources are sufficient to provide optimal care
for burn patients [19]. In the 20 kT example given above
Table 1 Potential roles of EMT in aftermath of thermonuclear event
Patient Category Immediate Management Where Role of EMT
Superficial burns up
to 30% TBSA
Oral resuscitation if over 15%,
analgesia, dressings,
availability of antibiotics
Ambulatory Distribution and instruction in use of
‘individual emergency burn pack’
Superficial burns over
30% TBSA and deep
burns up to 40% TBSA
Oral resuscitation if over 15%,
analgesia, dressings,
availability of antibiotics PLUS
early excision and grafting of
deep burns
Field Hospital Manage resuscitation, clean and dress
wounds, early excision and grafting.
Rapid training of temporary burn care
teams to assist with dressings, positioning,
mobilising, hygiene, feeding, etc.
Deep burns over 40%
TBSA
IV fluid resuscitation,
analgesia dressings and
transfer if possible
Transfer out of area to
functioning specialist
burns service
Confirm triage to ensure appropriate use of
very limited transport and specialist services
TBSA total body surface area
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there would be a possible 15,000 patients with burns
deeper than superficial and thus potentially requiring
surgery and if even 10% of these survived, it would still
overwhelm the existing burn services, thus a very
different model of managing these cases to maximise
potential survival must be seriously considered.
It is in the survivability consideration of the relatively
smaller nuclear weapons mentioned earlier that a curi-
ous and unexpected incentive emerges for vigorously
enacting a nuclear response training and exercise para-
digm for mass casualty thermal burn and other proto-
cols. As nuclear detonation events become more likely,
it is ironically fortunate that it is single or small numbers
of the smaller, Hiroshima-sized weapons that are reason-
ably expected to occur at least in the initial nuclear
events over the next decade or so. The number of burn
patients generated by these scenarios, while still cata-
strophic, will enable a credible response by a properly
prepared global health workforce. An encouraging ex-
ample toward this end is the WHO EMT initiative,
which operates on a regional basis through WHO
regional organizations, and enables the mobilization of
other resources outside that region, as would certainly
be necessary in a nuclear event. As these resources are
trained globally in a common network of terminology
and procedure, they have a common basis for cooper-
ation and combination of forces in a mass casualty crisis
such as a nuclear event. This approach should therefore
be able to significantly help enable the medical and pub-
lic health community to lead their respective communi-
ties into this future, and make it much less daunting
than is currently perceived. Therefore, creating a nuclear
global health workforce would be a critical first step in
help regional healthcare response entities in developing
realistic new strategies to deal with the inevitable after-
math of a catastrophic casualty scenario after a thermo-
nuclear event [3].
Conclusions
The risk of a nuclear event, either by accident or war,
has increased. This comes as evidence of increased
survivability from the most likely initial nuclear weapon
events has emerged. Multidisciplinary prevention, pre-
paredness and response, however, remain a major deficit.
Using the example of triage and management of one of
the more dreadful of its consequences, thermal burns,
the authors strongly recommend the development of a
WHO sponsored nuclear global health workforce.
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